Balancing intellectual monopoly privileges and the need for essential medicines by unknown
BioMed CentralGlobalization and Health
ssOpen AcceEditorial
Balancing intellectual monopoly privileges and the need for 
essential medicines
Greg Martin*1, Corinna Sorenson2 and Thomas Faunce3
Address: 1Science and Research Department, World Cancer Research Fund, 19 Harley Street, London, W1G 9QJ, UK, 2London School of 
Economics, LSE Health, Cowdray House, Houghton Street London, WC2A 2AE, UK and 3College of Law, Medical School, Globalization and 
Health Project – Centre for Governance of Knowledge and Development, Australian National University, Australia
Email: Greg Martin* - g.martin@wcrf.org; Corinna Sorenson - C.Sorenson@lse.ac.uk; Thomas Faunce - Fauncet@law.anu.edu.au
* Corresponding author    
Abstract
This issue of Globalization and Health presents a paper by Kerry and Lee that considers the TRIPS
agreement and the recent policy debate regarding the protection of public health interest,
particularly as they pertain to the Doha Declaration. In this editorial, we consider the debate, the
conclusions thereof, and identify five questions that should be considered by key stakeholders in
ongoing discussions.
Background
The World Trade Organisation's (WTO's) agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) has remained controversial ever since its incep-
tion at the behest of some of the world's largest multina-
tional corporations. Balancing the need to protect the
intellectual property rights (IPRs) (which the third author
considers are more accurately described as intellectual
monopoly privileges (IMPs)) of pharmaceutical compa-
nies, with the need to ensure access to essential medicines
in developing countries is one of the most pressing chal-
lenges facing international policy makers today. In order
for Commonwealth nations to craft and implement IPR
(or IMP) legislation that realises this balance, decision-
makers need to capitalise on the flexibilities and provi-
sions afforded by the agreement, particularly compulsory
licensing. Nonetheless, the industry-influenced US Trade
Representative (USTR) routinely opposes the use of such
flexibilities and, despite contrary injunctions in US law,
has sought to restrict them in a series of bilateral puta-
tively 'free' trade agreements.
Despite recent advancements in prevention and treatment
in many regions of the world, diseases such as HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis (TB) and malaria continue to scourge the
poorest and most vulnerable of the global population.
The vast majority of those suffering from these diseases
live in developing countries, where low wages, high phar-
maceutical prices and poor access to medical services
means there is limited, if any, access to many of the life-
saving drugs currently available in industrialised coun-
tries. In fact, about one-third of the world's population
does not have access to essential medicines. Currently, 80
percent of the world's population lives in developing
countries, but consumes less than 20 percent of all phar-
maceuticals.
The problem of access to essential medications for the
developing world is two-fold. First, research and develop-
ment (R&D) is principally being driven by market forces,
not medical need, when considered in light of estimates of
the global burden of disease. Specifically, problems typi-
cally inherent to the industrialised world (e.g. impotence,
obesity and baldness) are being prioritized over diseases
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malaria. Indeed, 90 percent of the burden for global dis-
ease is carried by a population for whom only three per-
cent of the R&D expenditure is directed. Of the 1,223 new
chemical entities developed between 1975 and 1996, only
11 were for the treatment of tropical diseases. Increas-
ingly, many large pharmaceutical corporations are not
even doing much of in-house R&D, but simply doing ven-
ture capital searches for small biotechs to acquire.
Second, high prices for brand name and patented phar-
maceuticals often create a barrier to access in developing
countries. Patent monopoly protection of new drugs
allows the inventing company sufficient time to recoup
their controversially-estimated R&D costs. Sponsors, how-
ever, often seek extra patent reward for innovation via a
number of existing 'loopholes'. For example, companies
often use bilateral trade agreements to eliminate reference
pricing that bases the price of a new drug on pharmac-
oeconomic evidence, such as its efficacy, safety, and cost-
effectiveness relative to comparable existing therapies.
Such tactics make patented medications prohibitively
expensive for people living in poorer countries. As a result,
international trade agreements have become an exceed-
ingly important issue for access to essential medicines and
health services.
Several multilateral agreements established by the World
Trade Organization (WTO), the central body governing
international trade, impact public health. Of these agree-
ments, 'Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights' (TRIPS) most significantly influences trade policy
in the pharmaceutical sector and global access to essential
medicines. One broader concern of the TRIPS agreement
is that the World Health Organisation (WHO) has only
non-voting observer status on the principal WTO policy
organ and most key WTO documents make no reference
to international economic, social and cultural rights, such
as the right to health in article 12 of the ICESCR (Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights).
Background on the TRIPS agreement
The TRIPS agreement, negotiated at the end of the Uru-
guay Round of the 'General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade' in 1994, sets forth global minimum standards for
protecting and enforcing all forms of IPRs (or IMPs),
including those for pharmaceuticals. The agreement con-
tains a number of requirements that WTO member coun-
tries must satisfy in their national laws. While all countries
are required to incorporate TRIPS standards, provisions
were stipulated to allow developing countries until 2006
and least-developed countries until 2016 to implement
these changes. While the agreement's 73 articles cover a
broad range of topics, there are several key requirements
related specifically to pharmaceuticals. In return for agree-
ing to these standards (given they had little endogenous
pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity), developing
nations were informally promised greater access to devel-
oped world agricultural markets. This has never eventu-
ated, so the failure to make TRIPS accession by such
developing nations formally conditional on such quid pro
quo appears to have been a gross negotiating error.
Exclusive patent protection and minimum 20-year term
A drug that is patented can only be made, used, imported/
exported or sold by the patent holder, subject to certain
public interest exceptions. Under the TRIPS agreement,
governments are required to recognise patents on prod-
ucts and processes in most areas of technology and to con-
fer rights to the patent holder for a given period of time.
This stipulation serves to protect the patent holder from
another party making, selling or importing the drug dur-
ing the period it is still under patent. Frequently, patent
protection results in significantly higher prices for pat-
ented medicines than in the context of market competi-
tion.
Rights conferred
While TRIPS upholds the rights granted to a patent holder,
it allows for limited exceptions and provisions, including
compulsory licensing, protection of proprietary informa-
tion, protection of trademarks and enforcement. This rec-
ognises that patents are not a natural form of human
rights, like freedom of expression or association, but are
really a monopoly privilege granted by society in return
for speedy access to and dissemination of important
knowledge. Indeed, it is this public interest benefit from
patents that has been so little supported by an agreement
such as TRIPS, particularly in the area of compulsory
licensing.
Non-discrimination
The TRIPS agreement requires that countries make patents
and all patent rights available 'without discrimination' on
certain grounds. Under TRIPS, countries are not allowed
to treat national and foreign inventions differently, nor
can their respective patent laws discriminate between
imports and domestic products. Moreover, pharmaceuti-
cal patent holders cannot abuse their dominant position
in contractual relationships to prohibit competition.
TRIPS also prohibits countries from creating legislation
that discriminates against any area of technology. Subse-
quent WTO trade panel decisions have clarified that this
latter prohibition does not apply where problems arise
regarding a particular area of technology, as demonstrated
by the Canadian Generic Medicines case on patent 'ever-
greening'.Page 2 of 5
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The TRIPS agreement indicates that patent rights need to
be balanced against other important interests, such as
public health. In shaping their laws to conform to TRIPS
standards, countries 'may take measures necessary to pro-
tect public health'. Standards are not always appropriate
for poor countries with a multitude of health and devel-
opment demands, developing countries can employ cer-
tain TRIPS provisions to protect public health. Such
options relevant to accessing essential medicines include:
exclusions to patentability; exceptions to patent rights;
parallel importing; compulsory licensing and promotion
of generic drugs.
Despite these provisions, concerns existed surrounding
the impact of TRIPS on access to essential medicines, par-
ticularly in developing countries. These issues were
addressed in June 2001 at the WTO Ministerial Confer-
ence in Doha, Qatar, when WTO ministers confirmed that
the TRIPS agreement should be implemented and inter-
preted in a way that supports public health and promotes
access to medicines. This agreement was captured in The
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which
affirmed the sovereign right of countries to take measures,
particularly through compulsory licensing and parallel
imports, to protect public health and give it priority over
intellectual property. Specifically, the declaration states
that the TRIPS agreement 'does not and should not pre-
vent members from taking measures to protect public
health... (and it) should be interpreted and implemented
in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect
public health and in particular, to promote access to med-
icines for all'. Of particular interest was the interpretation
of Article 31(f) of the TRIPS agreement, which states that
compulsory licensing shall be 'predominantly for the sup-
ply of domestic markets'. To this end, governments can
issue a license to a local manufacturer, whilst offering a
lower level of compensation to the originator. In effect,
compulsory licensing essentially lowers prices to consum-
ers by creating competition in the market for the patented
product. As many developing countries lack the domestic
capacity or technical expertise to manufacture patented
pharmaceuticals, the WTO further agreed to modify the
TRIPS provisions relating to compulsory licensing. In
August 2003, a temporary waver was established to permit
countries with local manufacturing the ability to issue
compulsory licenses and export drugs to countries unable
to produce pharmaceuticals domestically. In December
2005, the provision was confirmed as an amendment to
the TRIP agreement. Until such changes go into effect in
December 2007, the temporary waiver will apply.
The aforementioned actions demonstrate that some of the
issues surrounding the high costs of and limited access to
medicines in developing countries can be offset by regula-
tory measures. However, the existence of such provisions
is not sufficient in and of itself. Effective protection of
public health also depends upon successful implementa-
tion, as discussed below.
Implementation of the TRIPS agreement 
provisions
Despite the flexibilities granted by the TRIPS agreement,
few developing countries have employed them to develop
policies to protect public health. Consequently, organisa-
tions such as Medecins Sans Frontieres and Oxfam argue
that the provisions have had minimal impact on improv-
ing access to affordable medicines for the world's poor.
Effective implementation of such provisions, most nota-
bly compulsory licensing, has been adversely affected by
several factors.
First, the implementation of compulsory licensing is com-
plex and requires a sufficient local administrative infra-
structure, which is often prohibitively expensive, with
costs in excess of US$1.5 million. Second, the flexibilities
provided by the TRIPS agreement have been limited by a
number of recent developments, such as bilateral and
regional free trade agreements. Free trade agreements,
negotiated by the USTR industrialised countries (e.g., Aus-
tralia and South Korea), require commitments beyond
those specified by TRIPS. Such provisions include 1)
extending patent terms beyond 20 years for delayed mar-
keting approval, 2) limiting parallel imports of patented
drugs, restricting grounds for compulsory licensing, 3)
imposing 'data exclusivity' rules, 4) defining 'innovation'
to include minor 'me-too' molecular variations, 5) facili-
tating elimination of reference pricing, and 6) introducing
the pro-evergreening 'linkage' of safety and quality regula-
tory assessments of proposed new generic market entrants
with patent checks. The new patent laws in India highlight
the implementation of such 'TRIPS-plus' provisions.
Some commentators, such as the third author, however,
using criteria more closely related to public health and
relieving the global burden of disease, prefer to call such
arrangements with their valorizing of IMPs, 'TRIPS-
minus'.
Despite the challenges, several countries have taken steps
to use compulsory licensing and other flexibilities, such as
government-use orders. Examples of these steps include:
• Malaysia issued a government-use order and granted a
contract to a local firm to import three HIV/AIDS drugs
from an Indian manufacturer for supply to government
hospitals;
• The Zimbabwe government declared a health emergency
with regards to HIV/AIDS and, subsequently, issued com-Page 3 of 5
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or produce antiretroviral drugs; and,
• Canada recently passed legislation to allow Canadian
manufacturers to export antiretroviral drugs to countries
lacking production capacity. Royalties paid to the patent
holder vary according to the importing country's Human
Development Index. Despite strong good will from Can-
ada's largest generic drug manufacturer (Apotex), how-
ever, it has proved extremely difficult to develop a product
that would satisfy the exception.
• Having failed in prolonged negotiations with patented
drug manufacturers to obtain prices low enough to allow
them to provide essential medicines to meet significant
public health needs, Thailand and Brazil have recently
issued compulsory licenses over HIV/AIDS medications in
the face of strong opposition from the US Trade represent-
ative.
All of these measures have been actively opposed by phar-
maceutical multinationals and the USTR, with the WHO
less than forthright in extending strong support.
Utilising TRIPS: the issues and actions involved
To ensure that governments and policy-makers effectively
utilise the alternatives offered by the TRIPS agreement,
there are several issues and actions to consider. First, the
TRIPS agreement allows countries to use either strict or
flexible criteria for patentability. If flexible criteria for nov-
elty and inventiveness are implemented, pharmaceutical
companies may apply for patents for different formula-
tions of known drugs and thus expand the duration of the
protection beyond that of the original patent. Therefore, it
is important that health ministries work together to for-
mulate and/or revise their national patent legislation to
promote public health goals. TRIPS provisions can also be
used to stimulate access to generic medications, depend-
ing on the way in which national legislation is designed.
For example, countries may allow for testing and regula-
tory approval of generic versions of drugs before the pat-
ent has expired, thereby allowing availability of generics
soon after patent expiration. Additionally, national patent
legislation can be crafted to incorporate exceptions, trade-
mark provisions and other measures to support generic
competition.
In order to facilitate the prompt introduction ('spring
boarding') of generic medicine following the expiration of
patents, governments may enact 'Bolar exceptions',
whereby competing companies can make applications for
the development and approval of a generic product before
the patent expiration date. In November 1998, the Euro-
pean Commission and their member states requested that
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body establish a panel to
examine the application of the Bolar provision in the
'Canadian Patent Act'. The panel concluded that Canada
was in violation of their obligation under TRIPS by stock-
piling pharmaceuticals during the six months prior to the
expiry of the patents, but they were not in violation in
allowing the 'spring boarding' development and submis-
sion of information required to obtain marketing
approval for products without the consent of the patent
holder.
As previously discussed, the TRIPS agreement does not
limit the grounds or reasons for issuing a compulsory
license. Nonetheless, USTR-negotiated bilateral free trade
agreements, such as those with South Korea and Australia,
attempt to limit it to 'national emergencies of extreme
urgency.' Compulsory licensing should be allowed to be
employed to the full (in accordance with the Doha Decla-
ration on TRIPS and Public Health) to encourage access to
medications. However, the ways in which compulsory
licensing can be employed should be clearly defined and,
to reduce the risk of abuse, should be used only in accord-
ance with existing laws. Moreover, issues related to suffi-
cient patent protection and remuneration should be
considered to encourage the increased use of compulsory
licensing and maximize competition. Broadly, the WHO
recommendation that developing countries exercise cau-
tion in enacting legislation that is more stringent that the
TRIPS agreement requirements should be strengthened.
Countries pressured into making such concessions during
bilateral trade negotiations should be supported in inter-
preting their commitments in the light of the then extant
Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health. An encourag-
ing sign in this regard is that the US Congress, as a condi-
tion of renewing 'fast-track' (yes or no) approval of trade
agreements, required the USTR to stop pushing for limita-
tions to compulsory licensing, 'linkage' evergreening, and
patent term extensions for delayed marketing approval.
This leaves the door open for renegotiation of those prior
bilateral trade agreements with the US that have included
provisions limiting access to essential medicines.
Monitoring the TRIPS agreement
The TRIPS agreement has proven to be one of the most
controversial WTO agreements and the public health
impacts are still relatively unclear. As such, continued
monitoring of the agreement is necessary to analyse its
effects. Key questions to be raised include:
1. Should the TRIPS agreement be renegotiated to allow
new drugs for historically neglected diseases to be more
rapidly and effectively developed?
2. Is the introduction of ultra-low cost generic medicines
the answer or does this only ride on the lower environ-Page 4 of 5
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mental standards of factories in China and India, which
source the world's active product ingredients (APIs)?
3. Are the costs of essential drugs becoming affordable or
prohibitively expensive on a global scale? What regulatory
changes could be encouraged to ensure that access to both
quality generic and new patented medicines does not
become a two-tier problem with different drivers for rich
and poor?
4. Are transfers of technology and direct foreign invest-
ment in developing countries increasing or decreasing?
What impact is this having on the burden of disease?
5. Are poor countries able to implement the provisions
within the TRIPS agreement to protect public health?
What changes can be made to TRIPS to facilitate effective
implementation?
As evidenced, the role of IPR (or IMP) trade policy on
public health is of increasing relevance. Understanding
the TRIPS agreement is important for creating the legal
tools and public policies necessary to capitalise on the
potential offered by its provisions. In this context, it is cru-
cial to maintain the flexibilities established by the agree-
ment, especially with regards to developing countries, in
order to achieve greater equity in accessing medicines. To
reach this end, strong relationships between health minis-
ters and other governmental bodies should be established
to develop a unified strategy for effective policy develop-
ment.Page 5 of 5
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